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We study the local effects of the Housing Act of 1949, which established a federally subsidized program
that helped cities clear areas for redevelopment, rehabilitate deteriorating structures, complete comprehensive
city plans, and enforce building codes.  We use an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the program’s
effects on city-level measures of median income, property values, employment and poverty rates, and
population.  The estimates are generally positive and economically significant, and they are not driven
by differential changes in cities’ demographic composition.  The results are consistent with a model














  This paper develops new evidence on the local economic effects of an ambitious and highly 
controversial program of slum clearance and urban redevelopment that was undertaken in the United 
States after World War II.  Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 aimed to revitalize American central 
cities by offering federal subsidies for locally planned redevelopment projects.  When the subsidies 
were combined with powers of eminent domain delegated by state governments, local agencies were 
able to assemble, clear, and then sell parcels of land in “blighted” urban areas for redevelopment.  
Cities also received funding for planning, code enforcement, and the rehabilitation of structures and 
neighborhoods.  By the time new funding for the program ended in 1974, local authorities had been 
awarded federal support for more than 2,100 distinct urban renewal projects with grants totaling 
approximately $53 billion (in 2009 dollars), as well as smaller sums for related activities (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] 1974a, p. 15).
1   
  Although the U.S. urban renewal program ended nearly 40 years ago, the economic problems 
that it attempted to address, the basic policy tools that were employed, and the ensuing conflict over 
its implementation are not specific to American cities in this period.
2  Policymakers in many 
countries struggle to manage urban growth and modernization while balancing demands for 
individual property rights, historic preservation, and housing for the poor (Priemus and Metselaar 
1993, Mukhija 2001, Zhang and Fang 2004, Field and Kremer 2005, Wines and Ansfield 2010).  
Arguments favoring policies that facilitate urban redevelopment typically claim that private agents 
face prohibitive transactions costs in assembling parcels of land that could be put to more productive 
                                                      
1 The sum of federal grants for projects understates the magnitude of resources associated with the 
program’s operation for several reasons: the public funds typically just cleared the way for re-
development, which entailed an unknown but large amount of subsequent investment; the grants covered 
only a portion of the costs for planning, acquiring, and clearing land; and the range of urban renewal 
“programs” was broader than specific “projects.” After 1974, federal funds were channeled to cities under 
the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program.  See Galster et al. (2004) on CDBG. 
2 The program was originally characterized as “slum clearance” and “urban redevelopment,” but for 
brevity and consistency with later terminology, we refer to it as “urban renewal.” The Housing Act of 
1937 initiated federal funding for public housing and encouraged slum clearance.  It was modest in scale 
compared to urban renewal efforts under the Housing Act of 1949.    2
use and that positive externalities from redevelopment may benefit a city broadly.  Whether such 
benefits accrue in practice is a difficult and important empirical question.     
  Much has been written about the U.S. urban renewal program, but surprisingly few studies 
have collected and analyzed pertinent data.
3  We exploit the substantial degree of cross-place 
variation in urban renewal activity to estimate the program’s effects on city-level economic 
outcomes.  The paper makes three main advances toward a better understanding of the program’s 
effects.  First, because cities planned and undertook the projects, selection is likely to bias ordinary 
least squares estimates; therefore, our empirical strategy features an instrumental variable that legally 
constrained cities’ ability to participate in the program.  Second, we compile and examine a new 
dataset for all cities with more than 25,000 residents in 1950 and 1980, thereby spanning the entire 
period during which the program operated and the recipients of the vast majority of urban renewal 
funding.  Since urban renewal projects often took several years to plan and execute, spanning a long 
period, including several years after the program’s end, is important.  Third, to the extent that urban 
renewal affected city-level outcomes, we examine whether such effects worked primarily through the 
displacement of residents with relatively low levels of human capital (i.e., changes in population 
composition) or, alternatively, through channels consistent with economic growth.  We discuss these 
findings in the context of a simple Rosen-Roback framework of spatial equilibrium (Rosen 1979, 
Roback 1982). 
  The results suggest a far less dismal legacy for the U.S. urban renewal program than is 
commonly portrayed.  It appears that cities that were allowed to engage more actively in urban 
renewal posted better outcomes in 1980 than they otherwise would have in terms of property value, 
income, and population growth.  Moreover, these results were not achieved by merely pushing 
                                                      
3 Bingham (1975) is closest in spirit to our work.  He uses city-level data from 1960 and 1970 to describe 
the distribution of urban renewal funds and correlations between housing market variables and urban 
renewal grants.  More recently, Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2010) identified sizable land value 
effects from Richmond’s “Neighborhoods in Bloom” program, which, like urban renewal, targeted 
specific areas for concentrated program interventions.   3
residents with low human capital levels out of the city.  We caution that the results do not imply that 
Title I was the best way to provide aid to central cities by any criterion (economic or otherwise), nor 
do they imply that the dislocation costs for displaced residents and businesses were unimportant.
4  In 
practice, these costs and their perceived unfairness were fundamental to the program’s demise.   
 
1. Background  
A Brief History of American Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal 
  In the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II, housing and urban issues rose to 
the top of the U.S. domestic policy agenda, and the elimination of slums and redevelopment of 
central cities became prominent objectives (Gelfand 1975, Teaford 1990, Fogelson 2001).  As early 
as 1941, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and economists Guy Greer and Alvin Hansen 
published plans for federally-aided slum clearance and urban redevelopment that had many 
similarities to subsequent legislation (Foard and Fefferman 1960).  Proponents of urban renewal 
believed that blight was rooted in powerful negative externalities and was therefore “contagious.” 
They also argued that transaction costs inhibited the assembly and redevelopment of land in central 
cities by private enterprise, that city governments had neither the legal nor the financial resources to 
undertake large-scale clearance and renewal efforts, and that the problems associated with slums 
were a national policy priority (Slayton 1966).   
  In 1949, Congress authorized the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) to assist 
locally planned urban renewal projects with grants of two-thirds (or in some cases four-fifths) of the 
net project cost, where the net cost was defined as the difference between the total cost of acquiring 
and clearing properties and the income received from selling the cleared land.  The original Act 
emphasized slum clearance and redevelopment of a “predominantly residential” character, but 
                                                      
4 A full cost-benefit analysis of the program is beyond the scope of this paper.  See Rothenberg (1967) for 
a discussion of the difficulties such an undertaking would entail.  Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) address the 
potential pitfalls of public policies that target specific places.   4
subsequent legislation widened the program’s scope to include more rehabilitation and conservation 
efforts, made exceptions for projects that were not predominantly residential (including hospital and 
university expansions), and added emphasis on city-wide planning and code enforcement.   
  The grant application and project execution processes changed over time, but a typical 
chronology started with the creation of a Local Public Agency (LPA) that was “enabled” under state 
legislation to undertake urban renewal activities and to exercise eminent domain powers.  The LPA 
would identify an “urban renewal area” (characterized by “blight” or signs of deterioration), hold 
public hearings, seek approval from the local government (e.g., city council), and then seek approval 
from HHFA (or later HUD) to proceed with specific project planning in that area.  The project plans 
would include detailed information on current and proposed land use, changes in streets and utilities, 
aid for displaced residents and businesses, and estimates of the costs entailed.  Once approved, a 
combination of federal loans and grants would allow the project to proceed.
5  Projects often took 
several years to complete, and the slow pace of progress was a continual source of frustration. 
  As of June 30, 1966, the last date on which detailed data are available, approved projects had 
cleared (or intended to clear) over 400,000 housing units, forcing the relocation of over 300,000 
families, just over half of whom were nonwhite.
6  The proposed clearance areas included nearly 
57,000 total acres (90 square miles), of which about 35 percent was proposed for residential 
redevelopment, 27 percent for streets and public rights-of-way, 15 percent for industrial use, 13 
percent for commercial use, and 11 percent for public or “semi-public” use (HUD 1966, p. 9). 
  The urban renewal program began with fairly broad political support, but it became 
increasingly controversial with time.  Critics decried the disproportionate impact on poor residents, 
                                                      
5 This paragraph relies primarily on Slayton (1966) and Groberg (1968).  Also see Foard and Fefferman 
(1960) and Sogg and Wertheimer (1959).  We proceed as if the supply of grants was essentially elastic for 
projects that met HHFA or HUD requirements.  In fact, funding was subject to Congressional 
authorization and therefore to year-to-year changes in funding constraints.  
6 Approximately 54 percent of the displaced families were nonwhite (HUD 1966).  For perspective, the 
1950 Census of Housing characterized approximately 1.3 million units in metropolitan areas as 
“dilapidated” (defined in notes to table 1).     5
the use of eminent domain to trump private property rights, the destruction of cohesive 
neighborhoods, the loss of historic buildings, and the aesthetics of the new structures (Jacobs 1961, 
Anderson 1964, Gans 1965, Wilson 1966, and von Hoffman 2000, Gotham 2001).  Although national 
publications, such as Time Magazine (Nov. 6, 1964), trumpeted the program’s accomplishments well 
into the 1960s, and proponents responded strongly to the critics and clarified the program’s goals and 
lessons-learned (Groberg 1965, Abrams 1966, Slayton 1966), political support for the program 
eroded.  New funding halted in 1974. 
 
Potential Effects: Urban Renewal and Spatial Equilibrium 
  Once a local urban renewal program was undertaken, how might it have affected city-level 
outcomes?  The most direct impact would be on the areas targeted for clearance, redevelopment, or 
rehabilitation.  By knocking down relatively low-quality housing and commercial buildings, the left-
hand tail of the distribution of building quality might be thinned out, and the means and medians of 
various city-level measures might rise mechanically.  However, the implicit model held by 
proponents of urban renewal emphasized the role of substantial spillovers within the city.
7  Blight 
was considered geographically contagious, highly detrimental to the well-being of people living in or 
near such areas, a growing drain on public resources, and both a cause and consequence of middle-
class flight and local governments’ fiscal problems.  It was argued that reversing the fortunes of 
specific areas would benefit the city through a virtuous circle (e.g., less blight, less outmigration, and 
higher property values across the city), or at least by short-circuiting the process of deterioration.  In 
this context, recourse to eminent domain was important because assembling sizable areas of urban 
land through individual negotiations with multiple property owners was costly and subject to 
                                                      
7 Along these lines, Ioannides (2002) finds spillover effects in neighbors’ behavior regarding property 
upkeep in American Housing Survey data from the 1980s.  Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2010) find 
evidence of spillover effects on property values after targeted neighborhood improvements in Richmond, 
Virginia.  See Brueckner and Helsley (2009) for a model where market failures lead to urban blight and 
suburban sprawl.       6
holdouts (Davis and Whinston 1960).  In addition to effects emanating from specific projects, the 
program’s emphasis on code enforcement, city-wide planning, and rehabilitation might have had 
broader impacts (Carey 2001).   
  Urban renewal attempted to make central-city locations more attractive to both residents and 
businesses.  In an inter-city spatial equilibrium model with freely mobile workers, capital, and goods, 
as described by Roback (1980, 1982), a higher level of local amenities that are valued by both 
workers and firms (“productive amenities”) tends to raise equilibrium property values because for 
any given wage level, both workers and firms are willing to pay more to locate in that place.  The 
amenities have an ambiguous effect on wages, however, because for any given rent level, workers 
are willing to accept lower wages to have access to the amenity, but firms are willing to pay higher 
wages.  Figure 1 illustrates the simplest version of the model.  V(w, r; α1) is an indirect utility curve 
showing how consumers are willing to trade off wages (w) for rent (r), given a level of local 
amenities, α1.  C(w, r; α1) shows the isocost tradeoff for competitive firms.  A change in productive 
amenities from α1 to α2 leads to a shift of both curves, a rise in r, and the theoretically ambiguous 
movement of w.  Behind the scenes of figure 1, the improved amenities attract workers, implying a 
rise in population.   
  The model’s predictions are less clear when one adds consideration of a separate non-traded 
goods sector, such as housing production.  If the amenity affects productivity only in the tradable 
goods sector, then the model predicts higher wages, housing prices, and population.  But if the 
amenity affects productivity in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors and also affects consumer 
amenities, then only population growth would be unambiguously positive.
8  For instance, workers 
and firms may tend to bid up the value of local property, but an improvement in housing sector 
productivity would tend to lower prices.  We return to this framework when discussing the results in 
                                                      
8 See Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) or Moretti (2011) for recent extensions and applications of the Rosen-
Roback model.   7
section 4.   
  Of course, it cannot be taken for granted that urban renewal had any noticeable impact on 
cities’ level of amenities, productivity, or prices.  Schall (1976), for example, develops an intra-city 
model that features externalities in property upkeep and shows that renewal-like efforts to raise local 
housing quality may be unsustainable.  When the competitive equilibrium is at a relatively low level 
of quality, targeted local improvements have short-lived effects.  But the possibility of multiple 
equilibria in Schall’s model allows for a sustained, positive urban renewal effect.  Whether the urban 
renewal program actually had economically significant effects on American cities remains an open 
empirical question.   
 
2. Empirical Strategy  
Data and Empirical Framework 
  The goals of Title I were broad and predicated on the belief that targeted improvements 
within a city could have positive effects for the city as a whole.  Because the goals and hypothesized 
effects were city-wide in scope and because the program was carried out by city governments, we 
examine the link between urban renewal activity and city-level economic outcomes reported in the 
1980 Census of Population and Housing.
9  We collected information on urban renewal activity from 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Urban Renewal Directory, which was last 
published in 1974.  For each project in each city, the Directory lists the value of federal grants 
approved and disbursed up to the publication date.  This city-level sum includes both urban renewal 
projects and funds for smaller initiatives that were added under the urban renewal programs 
umbrella.  The close connection between federal funding and urban renewal expenditure ensures that 
                                                      
9 Detailed city-specific case studies, such as White (1980) would complement this paper’s analysis, but 
such analysis would entail a difficult selection problem at the neighborhood level.  Unfortunately, the data 
underlying White (1980) could not be recovered (personal communication with author).  Our search at the 
National Archives and inquiries to HUD did not uncover a systematic collection of city-specific plans.     8
variation across cities in the volume of federal grants is a reliable indicator of variation in urban 
renewal activity.  We scale the “grants approved” figure by the population of each city in 1950, and 
all regressions control for city-specific characteristics that might confound the interpretation of 
differences in grant levels across cities (e.g., pre-existing differences in property values).
10  The 
instrumental-variable strategy, discussed below, addresses concerns regarding the endogeneity of 
funding and measurement error in the true intensity of urban renewal activity.  
  The central empirical question examined in this paper is whether more intensive urban 
renewal programs (URij, where i represents the city and j the census division) led to better economic 
outcomes in 1980 (Yij80), conditional on each city’s economic and population characteristics at the 
time of the federal program’s implementation (Xij50) and eight census-division indicator variables 
(δj).  That is, do estimates of β1 in equation 1 suggest a favorable effect of urban renewal efforts?  
(1)     Yij80 = α + β1URij + X
N
ij50 β2 + δj + uij80 
The main outcome variables of interest are the log of median value of owner occupied property, log 
of median family income, employment rate, and poverty rate.  Subsequent analyses examine 
additional outcomes, including population and housing stock variables.  The extensive set of pre-
program control variables (Xij50) includes: housing stock characteristics in 1950 (the percentage of 
housing units built before 1920, the percentage that were dilapidated, the percentage that lacked 
indoor plumbing, the percentage that were crowded, the percentage that were owner-occupied, and 
the log median value of owner-occupied units); population characteristics in 1950 (the nonwhite 
percentage of the population, median educational attainment of those over age 24, and the log of the 
                                                      
10 The Urban Renewal Directory reports nominal sums approved and dispersed as of June 30, 1974 for 
each city.  It is not feasible to precisely adjust each city’s nominal sum for inflation over the course of the 
program, but we have undertaken an analysis in this spirit.  For each city, we assumed that projects were 
undertaken at a constant rate from the year of the city’s first project execution until 1974, and we used the 
GDP deflator series to scale the nominal sums.  Effectively, urban renewal spending in early years gets 
scaled up in value relative to later years.  The IV regression results with this adjusted UR variable are 
similar to those reported below, but the coefficients are somewhat lower because the values of the 
adjusted UR variable are larger.  We prefer the simpler approach that takes the reported values from the 
Urban Renewal Directory at face value.   9
city’s total population); and economic characteristics in 1950 (log median family income, the 
employment rate, the percentage of employment in manufacturing, and the percentage of families 
with income below $2,000 [a proxy for poverty]).  The list of control variables always includes the 
1950 value of the outcome variable.
11  The census-division indicator variables capture differences in 
trends across regions.  Summary statistics are in appendix table 1, and sources are described in the 
data appendix. 
  The main econometric problem in interpreting an estimate of β1 as a program effect is that 
urban renewal projects were initiated, planned, and carried out at the local level.  Even with a rich set 
of city-level control variables (Xij50) and census-division indicators (δj), unobservable city-level 
differences may be correlated with both the intensity of program participation and subsequent 
economic outcomes.  Cities that were deteriorating relative to others in ways that are not captured by 
the control variables might have pursued a large volume of urban renewal projects; such cities might 
have ended up with worse economic outcomes than other cities in 1980 but with better outcomes 
than if they had gone without the funding (the OLS coefficient on funding would understate the true 
impact of UR funding).  Or, the opposite case could hold—cities with profitable investment 
opportunities might have enthusiastically pursued urban renewal projects.  Such places might have 
posted relatively strong outcomes in 1980 even if the renewal program had no real effect. 
  We address this problem by finding plausibly exogenous variation in cities’ urban renewal 
funding that is due to differences in the timing of state-enacted enabling legislation.  Enabling 
legislation permitted and set legal parameters for the creation of local public agencies (LPAs) that 
could exercise eminent domain to acquire property for private redevelopment, a prerequisite to 
undertaking urban renewal projects.  This legislation was crucial to the implementation of federally 
funded urban renewal projects and is often cited in the early social science literature that considers 
                                                      
11 See Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 243-247) for discussion of specifications that control for the pre-
program value of the dependent variable.   10
cross-city differences in funding (e.g., Straits 1965, Plott 1968, and Bingham 1975), in historical 
accounts of urban renewal initiatives (e.g., Teaford 1990, Fairbanks 2002, 2006), in considerations of 
the program’s legal aspects (e.g., Sogg and Wertheimer 1959, Pritchett 2003), and in urban planning 
publications (e.g., see Greer and Hansen 1941 and issues of the Journal of Housing).  Archival 
material indicates that HHFA (HUD’s predecessor) closely monitored the development of enabling 
legislation because it determined cities’ ability to participate in the program.
12   
  Given that federally funded urban renewal could not be undertaken without state enabling 
legislation, that Title I funding ended in 1974, that political opposition to the program increased with 
time, and that there was learning-by-doing in formulating project proposals, a delay in enabling 
legislation would narrow a city’s window of opportunity for participation.  There is historical 
evidence that state legislative delays constrained the participation of cities that wanted to undertake 
urban renewal.
13  A priori, such constraints might seem most likely to bind for smaller cities with 
comparatively little political influence, but even large cities were affected by delays in enabling 
legislation.  This interpretation is emphasized in studies by historian Robert Fairbanks, who notes 
that “When Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949, Dallas and Phoenix civic leaders applauded 
the new law as an important aid in their fight against bad housing and downtown blight” (2006, p. 
309).  However, he notes that, “The delay in state-enabling legislation deeply inhibited Dallas’s 
ability to participate in slum clearance and redevelopment during the 1950s and 1960s” (p. 310) and 
                                                      
12 For example, a memo from C.L. Farris (Chief of Field Operations) to H.S. Keith (Director of Slum 
Clearance and Urban Redevelopment) dated December 5, 1950 discusses cities that are interested in Title 
I funds pending the passage of appropriate state enabling legislation.  A memo from A. Foard (Assistant 
General Counsel) to Charles Horan (Area 4 Supervisor) dated May 10, 1951 describes the status of 
enabling legislation in the West (National Archives, College Park, Maryland, Record Group 207, Urban 
Renewal Administration, General Subject Files).   
13 In states that did not pass enabling legislation quickly, the Journal of Housing reports on repeated 
efforts, spearheaded by cities, to introduce and pass the legislation.  Separately, several cities are listed in 
the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (81
st Congress, Volume V, p. 286) as “Communities for S 1070 
and HR 4009” (the Housing Act of 1949) that are in states that passed enabling legislation relatively late, 
implying that they were constrained in their program participation.  Bingham (1975, p. 84) reports that 
later enabling legislation tended to be more restrictive in terms of requirements for referenda on urban 
renewal programs and projects.   11
that “Despite the initial burst of enthusiasm, Phoenix, like Dallas, had to wait until state legislators 
passed the necessary enabling legislation” (p. 315).
14  In other work, Fairbanks argues that “No urban 
redevelopment would be allowed in Texas until the state passed enabling legislation specifically 
permitting cities to establish redevelopment authorities.  The delay would have dire consequences for 
many Texas cities since it halted implementation of the program in the state and allowed opponents 
of urban renewal to organize an effective lobby” (2002, p. 186). 
  In Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida, rulings by state courts forestalled and curtailed the 
implementation of urban renewal programs.  Whereas other state courts interpreted the “public use” 
qualification for eminent domain fairly broadly when assessing the program’s validity, specifically 
allowing for private redevelopment under Title I, the courts in these three states did not.  Later in the 
paper, we test whether an IV based solely on these judicial decisions confirms the basic results that 
are based on differences in the timing of effective legislation.   
  If delays of enabling legislation (1) affected city-level urban renewal participation, (2) did not 
influence city-level outcomes in 1980 through other channels, and (3) are not correlated with 
unobserved factors that did influence outcomes in 1980, then the timing of enabling laws may serve 
as a credible instrumental variable for urban renewal funding.
15  In the paper’s next subsection, we 
focus on examining the first condition—whether enabling legislation affected city-level funding 
levels.  The specific nature of the urban renewal enabling legislation makes it unlikely to have 
influenced 1980 outcomes through any channel other than urban renewal program participation 
(condition 2).  Potential omitted variables and unobservables (condition 3), such as contemporaneous 
social and urban programs, secular economic trends, differences in political conservatism, and 
                                                      
14 Fairbanks (2006) goes on to note that although representatives from Dallas, Fort Worth, and San 
Antonio pushed for the state-enabling legislation, representatives from rural areas and various industry 
groups (e.g., Texas Real Estate Board and Texas Association of Home Builders) worked to defeat it. 
15 In our main analysis, we use the timing of legislation as reported in Aiken and Alford (1972).  This 
maintains consistency with earlier studies and assures readers that judgment calls in coding have not been 
influenced by our intention to use the laws in subsequent IV regressions.     12
relevant state policies are assessed in section 3.   
 
Urban Renewal Activity and Enabling Legislation  
  Table 1 reports ordinary-least-squares regression estimates of equation 2, where URij is urban 
renewal funding per capita (in city i and census division j) and Lij is each city’s “years of potential 
participation” in the federal urban renewal program, defined as the difference between 1974 and the 
year in which enabling legislation was passed.  
(2)       URij = γ + τ1Lij + X
N
ij50 τ2 + λj + eij80 
Similar to equation 1, Xij50 is an extensive set of city-level characteristics in 1950, and λj is a set of 
census-division fixed effects (states are grouped into nine census divisions).  For consistency with the 
IV regressions that follow, we use a sample of 458 cities with populations of at least 25,000 in 1950 
and 1980 and without missing data on outcome or control variables.
16  If enabling legislation 
constrained cities’ ability to plan, apply for, and receive federal grants, then estimates of τ1 should be 
positive.   
  Table 1’s first regression specification (column 1) includes only the census-division fixed 
effects and Lij.
17  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are adjusted for correlation within states.  
The results indicate that an additional year of eligibility for participation is associated with 10.55 
additional dollars of grants per capita; the standard error is 2.88.  In column 2, the estimate of τ1 is 
virtually unaffected by adding the full set of 13 control variables for observable city characteristics 
(Xij50) that one might expect to underpin local demand for urban renewal projects.  Rather than being 
undercut, the estimate of τ1 increases slightly (from 10.55 to 11.15) and remains statistically 
significant.  This pattern is consistent with state enabling legislation affecting local urban renewal 
funding in a manner that is essentially independent of local characteristics.    
                                                      
16 The population threshold reflects the availability of city-level census data in Haines (2004). 
17 Tobit regressions also suggest strong and statistically significant correlations.  We focus on OLS results 
for consistency with the first-stage regressions of the IV estimates that follow.   13
  The specification in column 2 corresponds to the first-stage of the baseline IV estimates that 
are presented in the paper’s next section, where we address concerns about the instrument’s 
excludability from the second-stage at length.  We have tested the robustness of the first-stage 
relationship extensively.  Additional control variables for local political conservatism, city tax 
revenue per capita in 1950, state income per capita, and new federal highway mileage have little 
influence on the estimate of τ1.
18  The correlation between funding and enabling legislation also 
remains strong when omitting cities with over 500,000 residents or the largest city in each state, or 
when dropping each census division from the sample in turn.  Thus, the first-stage correlation 
reported in table 1, column 2, is not driven by otherwise unobserved differences in political 
orientation, willingness or ability to tax, cross-state income differences, the sample’s most powerful 
cities, or an idiosyncratic census division.    
  In summary, legal requirements, historical studies, and archival information indicate that the 
timing of state enabling legislation constrained cities’ ability to participate in the urban renewal 
program.  Delays in access to the program narrowed the window of opportunity for planning and 
carrying out urban renewal projects.  This interpretation is supported statistically by a strong link 
between the quantity of local urban renewal funding and the year of state enabling legislation, even 
when controlling for observable city characteristics.  The regression results are consistent with a 
pattern of quasi-random assignment of enabling legislation across cities within census divisions.  
 
3. Urban Renewal Effects   
Reduced-Form Results and a Falsification Test with Rural Counties  
                                                      
18 Conservatism is proxied by the proportion of county votes for Barry Goldwater in 1964’s presidential 
election.  Goldwater opposed urban renewal programs, and 1964 was the first year the Republican Party’s 
platform criticized urban renewal, so this is a relevant gauge of local conservatism.  Nate Baum-Snow 
kindly supplied highway data from his paper on suburbanization (2007).  We lose almost half of the 
sample when controlling for the change in central-city federal highway miles, but in the reduced sample 
estimates of τ1 are similar with and without the highway control variable (12.6 compared to 12.8).    14
  If state enabling legislation substantially affected cities’ ability to participate in the urban 
renewal program and if benefits from participation actually existed, then one would expect to find 
evidence that links variation in city-level economic outcomes (Yij80) to variation in enabling 
legislation (Lij) in reduced-form regressions (Angrist and Krueger 2001).  However, if state enabling 
legislation for urban renewal strongly predicts outcomes in rural areas, that would suggest that the 
paper’s main instrumental variable is correlated with unobserved determinants of post-1950 
economic outcomes, and therefore an invalid basis for making causal inferences about the program’s 
effects (assuming that positive spillovers from urban renewal are not strongly felt in rural areas).   
  The first row of table 2 reports reduced-form regressions for cities, controlling for the same 
set of pre-program characteristics (Xij50) and census-division indicators as described above.  There is 
strong evidence of a positive correlation between economic outcomes in 1980 and years of potential 
participation in the urban renewal program.  For instance, 5 extra years of enabling legislation is 
associated with approximately 4 percent higher median property values and 1 percent higher family 
income.  The results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  An added-variable plot of the 
data underlying the property value result is shown in Figure 2A.   
  We constructed a separate dataset of rural counties using Haines (2004), defining counties as 
“rural” if they had less than 25 percent urban population in 1950.  This yields approximately 1,500 
counties in 46 states, or about half of all U.S. counties.  Because some states passed enabling 
legislation in stages (discussed below), row 2 assigns each rural county the earliest year of its state’s 
enabling legislation, whereas row 3 assigns the latest year of the state’s extension of enabling 
legislation.  In both cases, the regression results show no evidence of a relationship between urban 
renewal enabling legislation and outcomes in the rural counties.
19  Coefficients in the rural county 
regressions never approach statistical significance, and they are often small and have the opposite 
                                                      
19 The county-level control variables are similar to those in our city-level regressions, but not exactly the 
same due to the availability of variables in Haines (2004).  See table 2 notes.     15
sign relative to the city-level results.  This strongly suggests that the instrumental variable is not 
simply reflecting unobserved differences across states in economic trends.  Figure 2B is an added-
variable plot of property values in rural countries and state enabling legislation for urban renewal. 
 
Instrumental Variable Regression Results  
  We estimate the effect of urban renewal activity in equation 1 by instrumenting for funding 
(URij) with the amount of time eligible for participation under enabling legislation (Lij).  In all the 
regressions we include the full set of city-level control variables (Xij50) described above, as well as 
the census-division dummy variables.  The implicit first-stage regression results are the same as those 
in table 1, column 2.  The F-statistic for the instrumental variable in the first-stage regression is 13.1, 
a fairly strong relationship that should mitigate biases associated with weak instruments and with 
deviations from the assumed exclusion restriction (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 
1997; Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002; Conley, Hansen, and Rossi 2008).    
  The base-specification estimates of β1 are reported in row 1 of table 3, where each table entry 
is from a separate regression.  The results suggest that urban renewal programs led to higher median 
income and higher median property values in 1980 at a 5 percent level of statistical significance.  The 
estimated effects on the employment rate and percentage of families in poverty are less precisely 
estimated, but they are consistent with favorable effects. 
  For a program that is widely held in low regard, the basic results in table 3 are striking: a 
$100 per capita difference in grant funding is associated with a 2.6 percent difference in 1980 median 
income and a 7.7 percent difference in 1980 median property value.  The median city in our dataset 
received $122 per capita in funding, and so the coefficient estimates imply an economically 
significant impact.   
  Because total investment (a combination of private and public resources) in the wake of 
federal urban renewal funding is an unknown multiple of the federal grant and because these   16
resources might have been invested elsewhere in the absence of urban renewal programs (e.g., more 
suburban development), the coefficients from these city-level regressions should be interpreted with 
care.  They are not estimates of the social returns on investment or local fiscal multipliers.   
  It is interesting that the IV regression results are substantially more positive than comparable 
OLS results, which are reported in appendix table 2.
20  Assuming for now that the instrument is valid, 
this suggests that urban renewal funding was correlated with unobserved negative shocks or trends, 
which bias downward the OLS estimates of urban renewal effects.   
 
Robustness to Additional Controls 
  We consider several scenarios in which the basic estimates of urban renewal effects might be 
confounded by omitted variables.  Essentially, these are circumstances under which the instrument is 
hypothetically correlated with the error term in equation 1 (violating “condition 3” described above).  
Later, we test the sensitivity of the results to a substantial recoding of the enabling legislation 
instrumental variable and to using an instrumental variable that is based on state court rulings that 
delayed program participation.   
  First, it is possible that government programs that were coincident with urban renewal 
influenced city-level outcomes.  If participation in these programs were uncorrelated with the timing 
of state-enabling legislation for urban renewal, then the IV estimates would still be valid.  But since 
some programs were related to urban renewal (e.g., established in related legislation or motivated by 
similar concerns), we have run regressions that include control variables for the number of public 
housing units per capita built under Housing Act of 1949; whether the city filed a first-round 
application for the Johnson Administration’s “Model Cities” program; and city-level spending per 
capita on poverty programs circa 1966.  If the IV regression results were simply picking up a positive 
                                                      
20 The null hypothesis of exogenous urban renewal funding is rejected at the 5 percent level in the 
regressions for income, property value, and employment rate.     17
influence from these other programs, then the additional control variables should diminish the 
coefficient on urban renewal funding.  Instead, the results in row 2 of table 3 show that including the 
“other program” variables in the regressions tends to increase the magnitude of the coefficient on the 
urban renewal variable.   
  Second, high-quality local governments might be more adept at applying for federal grants, 
getting the necessary enabling legislation passed, and carrying out other functions that affect city-
level outcomes.  This interpretation seems inconsistent with the results in row 2, where participation 
in public housing and Model Cities may proxy for local government initiative or administrative 
capability.  It also seems inconsistent with the OLS results, where one might expect to see a positive 
link between outcomes and urban renewal funding if good local governments were coincidentally 
good grant writers and effective lobbyists.  We have undertaken additional investigation of the 
government-quality hypothesis by collecting Moody’s city bond ratings for 1950 (Porter 1950).  The 
ratings should reflect forward-looking views of cities’ fiscal soundness, which in turn depend on the 
quality of local management and underlying economic prospects.  Not all cities had ratings available, 
and so we assigned cities to one of three categories for analysis: relatively high ratings (Aaa to A 
ratings), relatively low ratings (Baa and below), and “rating not available.”  The results are similar to 
those in row 1.
21  We have uncovered no evidence that the quality or characteristics of local 
government drive the results.   
  Third, it is possible that differences in the timing of state enabling legislation are correlated 
with cross-state differences in support for cities.  If differences in such support contributed to 
differences in city-level outcomes in 1980, then the estimates above would exaggerate the effects of 
urban renewal.  Therefore, we collected information on state aid directed to city governments in 1952 
                                                      
21 The coefficients and standard errors are as follows, where the subscript denotes the regression’s 
dependent variable: βvalue = 0.000776 (0.000316); βincome = 0.000255 (0.000113); βemployment = 0.00337 
(0.00208); βpoverty = -0.00624 (0.00512).  Adding controls for bond ratings in 1982 do not alter the results, 
nor does controlling for the type of local government (e.g., mayor-council, city manager, nonpartisan 
elections).   18
from a Bureau of Census publication (U.S. Department of Commerce 1954b).  Expressed relative to 
the urban population’s size in each state, this provides a state-level variable that controls for 
differences in state government policy with respect to cities.  We also included a control variable for 
cross-state differences in political conservatism: the state-level percentage of votes for Barry 
Goldwater in the 1964 presidential election.  Row 3 of table 3 reports the IV coefficients on urban 
renewal funding from regressions that include both of these state-level control variables.  Again, the 
overall results are similar to those in row 1, with somewhat larger coefficients and standard errors.
22  
Results are also similar if analogous variables for state-aid to cities in 1962 or 1972 are added.     
  Fourth, secular shifts in the US economy may have favored some places relative to others.  If 
these differential trends are correlated with differences in the timing of enabling legislation within 
census division, the estimated urban renewal effects would be invalid.  The city-level control 
variables for economic and population characteristics, including the percentage of employment in 
manufacturing, should narrow the scope of this problem.  We can further address the issue by 
including a control variable that interacts detailed (three-digit) state-level industrial composition in 
1950 with national-level industry-specific growth rates between 1950 and 1980 (Bartik 1991), which 
we constructed using information from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, Ruggles 
et al. 2008).
23  The census division controls should capture much of the secular rise of the “sunbelt,” 
but we have also included a control variable for mean January temperature which others have found 
to be a strong predictor of city growth in this period (Glaeser and Tobio 2008).  The results are 
reported in row 4 of table 3 and are similar to the base results in row 1.   
  Finally, we dropped the largest city in each state from the sample and re-ran the basic IV 
                                                      
22 For a slightly reduced sample of cities we can add a city-specific control variable for per capita “aid 
received” from other governments in 1950 and/or per capita “intergovernmental transfer revenue” in 
1964-65 (Haines 2004).  The results are similar to those without the additional controls.  An HHFA 
document from 1962 listed five states known to provide some direct financial support for urban renewal; 
adding a dummy variable for this group of states had little effect on the estimates of interest. 
23 The 1950 census microdata are not sufficiently detailed to construct this variable at the city level.     19
regressions.  This leaves us with a sample of cities within each state that are less politically 
influential and more likely to find the timing of enabling legislation exogenous to their circumstances 
and demands.  The results are reported in row 5.  They are similar to the base results, and in most 
cases are marginally stronger in magnitude and statistical significance.   
  None of the robustness checks suggests that the basic results are driven by omitted variables 
that are correlated with the instrument and influence the outcomes of interest directly.  Although it is 
not possible to completely rule out contamination from unobservable shocks that are correlated with 
the instrument, such shocks would have to operate differentially across cities within census divisions 
in a manner that is not captured by the extensive set of base-specification control variables and 
subsequent robustness checks, and that conforms to the falsification test with rural counties.     
 
 Robustness to Changing Instruments 
  We start by replacing the original instrumental variable based on the timing of enabling 
legislation with two alternative codings.  Although we have confidence in the original variable’s 
coding reported in Aiken and Alford (1972), we discovered that the underlying sources are not well 
documented.  Therefore, we independently reconstructed the timeline of state enabling laws from a 
variety of sources, including many issues of the Journal of Housing, Book of the States, Municipal 
Year Book, archived reports from the Housing and Home Finance Agency (the predecessor of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development), and academic articles.  Reassuringly, our coding 
turned out to be similar to that in Aiken and Alford (1972), albeit not exactly the same.  A separate 
concern is that a handful of states passed legislation for a specific city early in the program and then 
later passed legislation permitting broader participation.  This may introduce some within-state 
variation in the instrument that is a function of city-specific demand.  We created two alternative 
codings that are based on our reading of the legislative history and incorporate adjustments so that all 
cities in each state are assigned the same “years of exposure” value.     20
  Row 6 of table 3 reports results when all cities in each state are assigned the earliest date of 
state enabling legislation, and row 7 reports results when all cities in each state are assigned the latest 
date.  Due to differences in our base coding relative to Aiken and Alford and to the shifting of 
assignments in some states to either the earliest or latest date of state legislation, about 20 percent of 
cities have a different “years of exposure” value in rows 6 and 7 than in previous rows.  Nonetheless, 
the pattern of regression results is similar to previous rows. 
  We have also run the regressions replacing the original instrument with an indicator variable 
that equals one if the state supreme court invalidated enabling legislation due to a relatively narrow 
interpretation of what constitutes a valid use of eminent domain.  This happened in South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Florida.  With this instrument, variation in predicted funding that enters the second 
stage is driven by differences in judicial interpretations that delayed program participation and 
created uncertainty about the scope and nature of legally viable projects.  The results are reported in 
row 8.  The first-stage relationship between the indicator and funding is strongly negative (F-statistic 
= 32.2), and the second-stage results are generally similar to those in row 1.  When we restrict the 
sample to southern cities, we get results that are consistent with those in row 8, but with somewhat 
larger point estimates and standard errors.
24   
  Using both years-of-potential-participation and state court reversals as instruments in the 
two-stage-least-squares regressions yields estimates that are close to the base results.
25  Both 
instruments are strongly correlated with funding in the first-stage regression.  With more than one 
instrumental variable, an overidentification test can assess whether the instruments are correlated 
with the regression errors, which would raise concerns about instrument validity.  In each regression, 
                                                      
24 The coefficients and standard errors are as follows, where the subscript denotes the regression’s 
dependent variable: βvalue = 0.00125 (0.000499); βincome = 0.000370 (0.000251); βemployment = 0.00696 
(0.00375); βpoverty = -0.00734 (0.00684).  There are 117 southern cities in the regressions.  Standard errors 
cannot be clustered by state in this case but are similar if clustered by metropolitan area or county codes.   
25 The coefficient estimates (and standard errors) are: 0.00081 (0.00030) for property value; 0.00025 
(0.000089) for income; 0.0044 (0.0022) for employment rate; and -0.0068 (0.0044) for poverty rate.     21
the overidentification test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid; the p-values 
of the test statistic are generally quite high.
26  In combination with the other robustness checks, this 
lends additional confidence regarding the credibility of the empirical strategy. 
  One important qualification attaches to the basic IV results.  Variation in the enabling 
legislation instrument is relatively large outside the industrial East North Central and Middle Atlantic 
regions, and the precision of the base results depends in large part on this variation.  When we run 
reduced form regressions and restrict the sample to cities in the Northeast and Midwest, the point 
estimates on years-of-eligibility-for-urban-renewal remain positive and roughly similar in magnitude 
to those from the full sample estimates (some increase and some decline in magnitude), but the 
standard errors are relatively large.
27    
 
4. Channels of Influence 
  If the urban renewal program affected city-level economic outcomes, as the regression results 
suggest, how were these results achieved?  One can imagine urban renewal’s effect working through 
a narrow, mechanical, and perhaps even perverse channel—essentially lopping off the left-hand tail 
of the housing-quality distribution and driving people with low levels of human capital and earnings 
out of the city.  We will refer to this as the “displacement channel,” which works by altering the 
composition of the city’s population.  Of course, a mechanism that merely displaces the poor from 
the city is quite different from the mechanism touted by proponents of urban renewal, who argued 
that it could impart a virtuous circle of renewal and growth or at least dampen an ongoing circle of 
deterioration.  For short, we will refer to this as the “renewal and growth channel.”  These two 
                                                      
26 The p-value on the Hansen J-statistic (overidentification test) is: 0.83 in the property-value regression; 
0.97 in the income regression; 0.39 in the employment regression; and 0.79 in the poverty regression. 
27 When restricted to cities in the Northeast and Midwest, the reduced-form coefficient falls to 0.0067 
(se=0.0045) for property value, rises to 0.0039 (se=0.0027) for income, rises to 0.056 (se=0.066) for the 
employment rate, changes little for the poverty rate (-0.062, se=0.13), and falls to 0.0048 (se=0.042) for 
population.  See table 2 for comparison with the full sample results.   22
channels of influence are not mutually exclusive.  Displacement of the poor, for example, could 
occur as a byproduct of rising property values, which in turn are anchored by gains in local amenities 
or productivity.   
  We shed light on these issues in two ways.  First, in IV regressions that are similar to those 
above, we directly examine whether urban renewal affected city-level proxies for the “displacement” 
or “renewal and growth” channels (table 4).  Then, to see if the basic results in table 2 are driven 
(partially or wholly) by changes in population characteristics, as the displacement hypothesis would 
suggest, we add control variables for potentially endogenous population characteristics (observed in 
1980) to the base regressions from table 3.  If the displacement channel were the primary means by 
which urban renewal affected outcomes, we would expect to see a sharp diminution of the point 
estimates on urban renewal funding (table 5). 
  The first two columns of table 4 estimate the effect of urban renewal on the median schooling 
level of the adult population and the black percentage of the population.  If urban renewal worked by 
disproportionately displacing from the city those with low levels of human capital or minority 
residents, one would expect the urban renewal coefficient in the schooling regression to be strongly 
positive or the coefficient in the black-share-of-population regression to be strongly negative.  We 
find no support for these hypotheses.  The estimated effect on schooling is small and imprecise, and 
there is no reduction in the black population (the point estimate is positive), even though black 
residents were disproportionately displaced from renewal areas within cities.
28   
  The next four columns of table 4 assess aspects of the “renewal and growth” channel.   The 
middle two columns report estimates of the effect on the overall size of the population and housing 
stock in 1980, controlling for their size in 1950, changes in land area, and the base set of 1950 
control variables (X).  The estimates suggest that the urban renewal program positively affected city 
                                                      
28 In a similar regression for the proportion of adults (age 25 and up) with less than four years of high 
school completion (rather than median schooling), we also get a small, imprecise point estimate.     23
population and housing units; a $100 per capita increase in urban renewal funding is associated with 
about a 9 percent increase in population and housing in the base specifications.  The point estimates 
are notably smaller, however, when only the court reversal instrument is used (row 8).   
  In the last two columns, urban renewal is associated with a lower proportion of old housing 
units in 1980 (i.e., units built before 1940).  The coefficient suggests that an additional $100 per 
capita in funding decreased the share of old housing by 3 percentage points.  The estimated effect on 
units-without-full-plumbing is also negative, but it is relatively imprecise.
29  
  In table 5, we re-run the base regressions from table 3 and add control variables that proxy 
for displacement: the racial and educational composition of the city in 1980.  The additional control 
variables may be endogenous to urban renewal, and so the resulting coefficients on urban renewal 
funding are no longer interpreted as estimates of the program’s overall effect.  Rather, the point is to 
see whether changes in city population characteristics underpin the coefficients estimated in table 3’s 
baseline regressions.  The first row of table 5 simply replicates the original results from table 3 for 
easier comparison; the table’s second row adds controls for the percentage black in 1980 and median 
schooling in 1980.  The coefficients on urban renewal are slightly larger in the augmented 
regressions, and so it seems highly unlikely that the positive estimated effects of urban renewal in 
table 2 are driven by changes in the city’s basic population characteristics.   
  The weight of evidence in tables 4 and 5—the absence of a discernable effect on the 
population’s composition in terms of race or education level, the relative increase in city population 
size, and the relative decline in the share of old housing units—is not consistent with a simple story 
in which urban renewal perversely raised city-wide outcome variables through displacement of those 
with relatively low levels of human capital.  The results are, however, consistent with a “renewal and 
growth” mechanism.  In particular, the combination of higher wages, property values, and 
                                                      
29 The census did not classify housing units as “dilapidated” in 1980, but in 1950 the correlation between 
the percent of units dilapidated and the percent of units without full plumbing was 0.77.  In results that are 
omitted for brevity, we find no effect on the percent of housing units that were owner-occupied.     24
populations are consistent with higher local productivity in the Roback model, as depicted by the 
rightward shift of C(r, w; α) in figure 1.
30     
 
5. Conclusion  
  The early post-war decades, especially the 1960s and 1970s, were far from an optimistic time 
in most American central cities, as residents and economic activity drained away (see Cullen and 
Levitt 1999, Baum-Snow 2007, and Boustan 2010).  To some critics, the urban renewal program was 
a prima facie failure because it did not prevent or reverse urban economic decline.  The spreading 
perception of failure—punctuated by riots, rising crime rates, and municipal fiscal crises—combined 
with concerns about the costs borne by the displaced and slow pace of redevelopment eventually led 
to the program’s political demise.  In a 50-year anniversary retrospective on the  1949 Housing Act, 
Robert E. Lang and Rebecca R. Sohmer wrote, “The consensus is that Title I urban renewal mostly 
failed, in part because large-scale slum clearance proved a crude and largely unworkable 
redevelopment method” (2000, p. 296).  In the same volume, Jon C. Teaford highlighted the 
usefulness of lessons learned from urban renewal and examples of well-regarded projects, but he also 
noted “…the chief product of Title I was a widely held commitment never to have another Title I” 
(2000, p. 463).  Nonetheless, the fundamental policy issues and tools associated with urban renewal 
remain highly relevant, and there is much to be learned from the extensive U.S. experience with 
government-facilitated urban redevelopment.  The large literature on U.S. urban renewal is 
remarkably thin when it comes to providing econometric evidence on the program’s effects.   
  This paper’s results strongly suggest that, on average, cities that were less constrained in their 
                                                      
30 Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) suggest that productivity and amenity parameters may be backed out of a 
Cobb-Douglas representation of the Roback model using regression of wage, housing cost, and 
population change.  There is considerable distance between measurement and theory in this exercise, but 
taking the parameterization and regression results at face value, our calculations suggest that urban 
renewal positively affected tradable sector productivity, had little effect on local consumer amenities, and 
negatively affected non-tradable productivity.   25
urban renewal participation had larger increases in property values, income, and population than 
similar cities that were more constrained in their participation.  This implies a far less dismal legacy 
than is commonly portrayed.  The patterns are consistent with the program spurring more central-city 
growth than otherwise would have occurred, rather than simply demolishing the left-hand tail of the 
housing quality distribution and pushing low-earning residents out of the city.  In fact, we find no 
evidence that the positive estimates of urban renewal effects are underpinned by changes in the 
observable characteristics of cities’ residents.  Again, it is important to acknowledge that the city-
level results do not imply that the costs imposed on relatively poor residents and small businesses 
that were displaced by urban renewal were unimportant, nor do they imply that the program was an 
optimal approach to assisting cities.    
  The results are broadly consistent with studies that suggest that targeted local investments 
may have sizable economic impacts, perhaps due to the strength of externalities and spillovers (cf., 
Rossi-Hansberg et al. 2010; Greenstone et al. 2010).  Arguments along these lines are commonly 
made in legal and political settings to justify local policy interventions and the use of eminent 
domain, but causal evidence supporting the claim is still relatively scarce.  Examining similar 
policies in other settings, undertaking further explorations of the causal pathways, and measuring the 
distributional consequences of such policies are important avenues for further research.    
      26
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Figure 1: Improvement in a “Productive Amenity”  
 
Notes: A rise in amenities that both consumers and producers value tends to raise the rental value of land 
(r) and have an ambiguous effect on wages (w), as in Roback (1980). The amenity level is denoted by α, 
and α1 < α2.  See text for more explanation. 
C(r, w; α2) 
C(r, w; α1) 
V(r, w; α1) 
V(r, w; α2) 
r 
w   32
Figure 2A: Added-Variable Plot for Cities,  
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coef = .0021, se = .0040
 
Notes: Each regression includes controls for observable local characteristics in 1950 (described in text) 
and census division fixed effects.  The results correspond to row 1 and 2 of column 1 in table 2.  33
Table 1: Urban Renewal Funding and Enabling Legislation 
 
 1  2 
Years of potential UR participation  10.548  11.153 
 (2.884)  (3.077) 
Percent units owner-occupied 1950  -----  -2.276 
   (1.591) 
Ln median property value 1950  -----  -70.259 
   (106.125) 
Percent units dilapidated 1950  -----  1.133 
   (3.217) 
Percent units built before 1920  -----  -0.165 
   (1.160) 
Percent units w/o full plumbing 1950  -----  -0.437 
   (1.642) 
Percent units crowded 1950  -----  0.059 
   (2.418) 
Ln population 1950  -----  -3.446 
   (15.575) 
Percent population nonwhite 1950  -----  1.354 
   (1.443) 
Percent employment in manufacturing 1950  -----  -1.126 
   (1.611) 
Percent labor force employed 1950  -----  -11.355 
   (7.292) 
Median years schooling 1950  -----  5.850 
   (24.697) 
Ln median family income 1950  -----  -11.644 
   (210.828) 
Percent families w/ income <$2k 1950  -----  -1.209 
   (4.801) 
Census-division dummies  Yes  Yes 
Observations 458  458 
R-squared 0.104  0.136 
Notes: The dependent variable is cumulative Title I grant approvals per capita at the city-level between 
1949 and 1974.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors corrected for correlation within states are 
reported in parentheses.  A “dilapidated” unit had “serious deficiencies, was rundown or neglected, or was 
of inadequate original construction, so that it did not provide adequate shelter or protection against the 
elements or endangered the safety of the occupants….was below the generally accepted minimum 
standard for housing and should be torn down or extensively repaired or rebuilt” (Bureau of Census, 
1954, volume II, part 1, p. XIV).  Units without full plumbing are those without “complete plumbing for 
exclusive use.”  “Crowded” units are those with more than 1 person per room.  Median property value 
pertains to owner-occupied housing.  Summary statistics are in appendix table 1. 
Sources: See data appendix.  34
Table 2: Comparison of City and Rural County Outcomes,  
Reduced-form Regressions of Outcomes on Instrumental Variable 
 
 Ln  median 
property value
Ln median family 
income
Employment rate Poverty rate Ln population
1. Sample of cities,  













2. Sample of rural counties,  













3. Sample of rural counties,  













Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate OLS regression of an economic outcome on years of eligibility for urban renewal (based on the timing 
of state enabling legislation) and control variables.  Row 1’s sample includes the cities examined in table 1.  Rows 2 and 3 include rural counties 
(less than or equal to 25 percent urban population in 1950, approximately half of all U.S. counties).  The underlying control variables for the city 
and county regressions are very similar but not exactly the same due to data availability in Haines (2004).  Differences are as follows: whereas the 
city regressions control for proportion of housing units built before 1920 (and counted in 1950), the county regressions control for the proportion 
of units built between 1940 and 1950 (and counted in 1950); whereas the city regressions control separately for the proportion of units without full 
plumbing and the proportion of units dilapidated, the county regressions control for the proportion with full plumbing and not dilapidated (a single 
variable); and whereas the city regressions control for the proportion of units with more than 1 person per room, the county regressions control for 
median number of rooms per unit and median number of persons per unit.  Standard errors are clustered by state. 
Sources: See data appendix.   35
Table 3: Urban Renewal Effects on Property Value, Income, Employment, and Poverty in 1980 
 




Employment rate Poverty rate
Panel A: Basic specification   











Panel B: Additional controls    
2: Add controls for public housing, 










3: Add controls for state aid to cities and 










4: Add controls for labor-demand shift 
(based on industrial composition) and 



















Panel C: Changing instruments   
6: Alternative legal coding, earliest year 































Notes: The top entry of each cell is the estimated coefficient on urban renewal funding per capita from a separate instrumental variable regression.  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are adjusted for correlation within states and reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  See table 1’s 
notes for variable definitions.   
Sources: See data appendix.     36












Panel A: Basic specification   
1: Controls for 1950 characteristics, 













Panel B: Additional controls   
2: Add controls for public housing, 














3: Add controls for state aid to cities 














4: Add control for labor-demand shift 




























Panel C: Alternative instruments   
6: IV with alternative legal coding, 














7: IV with alternative legal coding, 




























Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient estimate on urban renewal funding per capita from a separate IV regression.  Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are adjusted for correlation within states and reported in parentheses.     
Sources: See data appendix.     37
 
Table 5: Urban Renewal Coefficients, 
Regressions including Controls for Potentially Endogenous Population Characteristics 
 


















2: Basic specification plus 
controls for percent black and 
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Data Appendix 
Housing and Population Data 
  We manually entered data for the percent of dilapidated housing units, units built before 1920, 
units without full plumbing, and crowded units for 1950 from the published volumes of the 1950 Housing 
Census.  Data for dilapidated units and units without full plumbing are from table 18, data for crowded 
units are from table 19, and data for units built before 1920 are from table 20.  We collected data on the 
percent of families with incomes less than $2,000 from table 11 in the published volumes of the 
Characteristics of Population in the 1950 Population Census.  We collected data on median years of 
schooling of adults (over age 24) in 1980 from table 119 of the General Social and Economic 
Characteristics volume of the 1980 Census of Population. 
  Some of the black-specific data for 1980 were also entered manually.  Data for the percent of 
black owner-occupied units, median schooling, percent employment, and median family income were 
entered from the General Social and Economic Characteristics volume of the 1980 Census of Population.  
The percent of owner-occupied units are from table 22, median schooling data are from table 132, percent 
employment data are from table 134, and median family income data are from table 136.  Data for the 
percent of black units without full plumbing, crowded units, and median property values are from table 3 
of the General Housing Characteristics volume of the 1980 Census of Housing and data for the percent of 
old units are from table 77 of the Detailed Housing Characteristics volumes of the 1980 Census of 
Housing.   
  The data for population, land area, housing units, percent employment, median family income, 
median property values, percent of owner occupied housing, and percent of employment in manufacturing 
for 1950 and 1980 are from the 1952 and 1983 City Data Book files compiled by Haines (2004, file 
numbers 60 and 66).  These files also provide data for the percent of nonwhite residents and median 
schooling in 1950, and for the percent black, percent of crowded units, occupied units without full 
plumbing, families in poverty, and old units in 1980.  The 1983 City Data Book provides mean January 
temperatures, averaged from 1951 to 1980. 
 
Election, Government Spending, and Enabling Legislation Data 
  State and county-level votes for Goldwater in the 1964 Presidential Election were entered from 
David Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.  Data for state aid to cities were entered from “State 
Payments to Local Governments in 1952” in State and Local Government Special Studies, 35, published 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1954).  These data were divided by state urban population from 
1950 Characteristics of the Population (“old definition” of urban).     39
  Urban Renewal state enabling legislation data and data on city applications to the Model Cities 
program are from Governmental Units Analysis Data (Aiken and Alford 1972).  Data for units of public 
housing per capita built under the 1949 Housing Act, spending per capita on poverty programs circa 1966, 
and applications to the Model Cities program are also from GUAD.  We collected Urban Renewal funding 
data from the Urban Renewal Directory (HUD 1974).  To check the accuracy of the enabling legislation 
dates in GUAD, we created an alternative coding for the timing of enabling legislation based on our 
reading of the Journal of Housing, Book of the States, Municipal Year Book, archived reports from the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency (the predecessor of HUD) and academic articles.   
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Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. 
UR funds per capita (1950 population)  177.043  221.444 
Years of potential participation in UR program  22.581  4.266 
    
Ln population 1980  11.297  0.887 
Ln median family income 1980  9.827  0.172 
Employment rate 1980  92.632  2.925 
Percent of families in poverty 1980  11.040  5.143 
Median years of schooling 1980  12.467  0.717 
Percent black 1980  16.136  17.820 
Ln housing units 1980  10.382  0.896 
Ln median property value 1980  10.627  0.364 
Percent of units built before 1940  37.401  19.070 
Percent of units crowded 1980  4.208  3.538 
Percent of units w/o full plumbing 1980  1.66  0.907 
Percent of units owner-occupied 1980  54.327  11.325 
    
Ln population 1950  11.090  0.879 
Ln median family income 1950  8.120  0.175 
Employment rate 1950  94.950  2.018 
Percent of families with income under $2000 in 1950  21.410  8.997 
Median years of schooling 1950  10.310  1.268 
Percent nonwhite 1950  9.282  11.816 
Ln housing units 1950  9.901  0.885 
Ln median property value 1950  9.027  0.293 
Percent of 1950 units built before 1920   49.414  21.784 
Percent of units dilapidated   6.623  5.578 
Percent of units crowded 1950  12.727  6.587 
Percent of units w/o full plumbing 1950  21.723  13.412 
Percent of units owner-occupied 1950  52.317  11.690 
Percent of employment in manufacturing 1950  29.508  15.247 
    
New England  0.120   
Mid Atlantic  0.157   
East North Central  0.245   
West North Central  0.083   
South Atlantic  0.116   
East South Central  0.055   
West South Central  0.085   
Mountain 0.039   
Pacific 0.100   
Notes and sources: See table 1 and data appendix.  41
Appendix Table 2: OLS Results for Comparison with IV Results (in Tables 3 and 4) 
 
Panel A 
Ln median value  Ln median family 
income



















Ln housing units  Percent old housing 
units









Notes and sources: See table 3, table 4, and data appendix. 
 